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ABSTRACT 
 
While various theoretical arguments have been constructed that imply that a firm would see 
improved financial performance by increasing the proportion of women managers, previous studies 
on the issue, in Japan and elsewhere, have shown mixed results. Using data from Toyo Keizai and 
Nikkei NEEDS on 745 Japanese-listed companies, the authors investigate the impact of women’s 
managerial participation and, more generally, overall workplace and managerial gender diversity 
on corporate performance. They find a robust significant positive relationship between firm 
performance and both female manager ratio and gender diversity, after controlling for industry, 
firm size, capital structure, corporate governance, and compensation policy. This relationship also 
exhibits substantial nonlinearity, with the benefit decreasing as the proportion of women managers 
or managerial gender diversity increases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index of 2012, Japan ranked 101st out of 135 countries. The 
weakest indicator for Japan was its low ratio of women managers in firms (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 
2012). The gender gap is significantly greater in Japan than in any other advanced OECD country. 
 
While there are several arguments that suggest firms could improve their performance by more actively 
employing women in managerial roles, empirical studies have yielded mixed results. In both American and Japanese 
research, women managers have been shown, in some cases, to be beneficial to the bottom line of companies. 
However, those studies in the United States have tended to emphasize the benefits of gender diversity rather than 
women managers, specifically, whereas those in Japan have focused more on the effects of gender discrimination, in 
particular, statistical discrimination and wage differentials. Although gender diversity and the proportion of women 
managers are closely related and highly correlated at the low levels of female managerial participation witnessed in 
Japanese firms, they are not identical, with differing predictions of their connections to firm performance; so in this 
study, both are examined. 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to explore whether, and to what extent, women managers boost Japanese firm 
performance. The research is unique because it presents empirical evidence to test, with a robustness check to 
eliminate the possibility of reverse causation, whether both greater gender diversity and women’s managerial 
participation are associated with improved firm performance for Japanese-listed companies after controlling for size, 
industry, and various corporate accounting and governance measures, while separating out effects due to women 
managers from those due to women employees in general. Moreover, the curvature of these relationships is examined 
to estimate how they are modified, or even reversed, at higher levels of such participation and diversity. 
 
 
 
I 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Positive Effects of Increasing Gender Diversity and Female Managerial Representation 
 
Researchers have proposed various reasons for why there should be a positive relation between female 
managerial representation and firm performance, at least for low levels of such representation. Perhaps the most 
frequently considered justification is the beneficial effect of gender diversity, which generally increases in line with 
the proportion of women managers since they are in the minority in almost all firms. Laboratory studies of cultural 
diversity, including gender diversity, have generally yielded that the effectiveness of workgroups is enhanced by 
group-member diversity (Cox & Blake, 1991). More heterogeneous groups tend to have broader knowledge and 
experience, analyze issues from a wider range of perspectives, and thus consider and debate a larger set of proposals, 
producing higher-quality and more innovative solutions (Hoffman & Maier, 1961; DiTomaso, Post, & Parks-Yancy, 
2007). Gender diversity, in particular, has been found to enhance employees’ overall creativity and innovation because 
of the combination of different skills, perspectives, and backgrounds that men and women tend to possess (Egan, 
2005; Rogelberg & Rumery, 1996). Herring (2009) points out that diversity provides a competitive advantage 
through social complexity at the firm level as well, because businesses that draw on more inclusive talent pools can 
be more successful. Moreover, women may provide more insight into the needs of female customers (Daily, Certo, & 
Dalton, 1999; Nkomo & Cox, 1996). These benefits of improved problem-solving, creativity, innovation, and market 
insight are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources (Robinson & Dechant, 1997) and thus, according 
to the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991), can produce a sustained corporate competitive advantage. At 
the individual level, tokenism may impede the performance of members of a minority group when they are relatively 
few in number (Kanter, 1977). Empirical studies conducted by Frink, Robinson, Reithel, Arthur, Ammeter, Ferris, 
Kaplan, and Morrisette (2003) have supported these positive views of diversity, even going so far as to suggest that an 
organization’s optimal performance is achieved at maximum gender diversity (50% women). While these effects of 
diversity may be present throughout an organization, they are more likely to be significant at the managerial level, 
where most decision-making occurs. 
 
As these arguments relate to gender diversity specifically, the authors propose the following narrow 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Organizational gender diversity is positively related to firm performance. 
 
In addition to these diversity-based arguments, those primarily derived from human capital theory have also 
been advanced. These gender-asymmetric arguments provide reasons for why human capital may be higher at firms 
that employ more women managers in contrast to the manager fungibility assumption implicit in the preceding 
hypothesis. Such explanations can be divided into those based on discrimination and those based on motivation. 
 
Gender discrimination is pervasive in Japanese companies and society, in general, to a far greater degree than 
that found in developed Western nations (Barrett, 2004; Marikkar, 2007; Siegel & Kodama, 2011; OECD, 2012). To 
the extent that this would cause firms to underutilize women’s resources relative to their capabilities, increasing their 
employment should raise a firm’s performance. A “taste for discrimination,” although attributable to personal 
prejudice, if widely held, could lead to a systematic undervaluation of female labor, and managerial ability in 
particular, throughout the economy on which more “enlightened” firms could capitalize by increasing women’s 
(managerial) participation (Becker, 1971). Arrow (1973), however, doubted whether such inefficient behavior could 
survive long term in highly competitive markets, proposing instead an alternative explanation for discrimination - a 
form of so-called statistical discrimination - first described by Phelps (1972), which can lead to inequitable but, on 
average, efficient personnel decisions. However, it is debatable, and ultimately an empirical question, whether 
companies really operate in such unforgiving environments - the persistence of firm performance differences being an 
indication that they don’t. 
 
A number of different versions of statistical discrimination have been put forth, having differing implications 
for the connection between women managers and corporate performance. In the original model of Phelps (1972), 
discriminatory behavior is efficient, so that failing to discriminate, and thus hiring more women or paying them higher 
salaries while ignoring the additional informational content of their gender, would lead to worse outcomes. Simple 
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modifications of the model’s details could reverse this conclusion, such as in that of Aigner and Cain (1977) where 
women with equal productivity to that of men could be penalized by risk-averse employers if the informativeness of 
their qualifications was considered to be less reliable. Alternatively, if the assumption by Phelps is that employers 
accurately know that the average relative capabilities of men and women are relaxed, then an unconscious bias against 
women in the estimation of these averages, when combined with statistical discrimination, would produce the same 
exploitable inefficiency implied by taste-based discrimination. 
 
Theories of statistical discrimination based on coordination failure, such as that due to Arrow (1973, pp. 
23-32), also make varying predictions concerning the impact of increased female managerial participation and 
corporate performance. In these models, there is a self-fulfilling prophesy whereby lower expectations of women’s 
competence or productivity lead to lower expected benefits to investment in improving their human capital, which 
discourages the undertaking of such efforts whence ultimately justifying the lower expectations. In the case where the 
investment is done by the worker prior to entering employment, such as with education, one would not expect to see 
any gain to those firms that fail to discriminate, as any benefit that would follow from such increased incentive for 
women to acquire more skills would accrue to all firms. By contrast, in models where the cost is borne by the firm; for 
example, in the form of training, a firm that offered more professional career-track opportunities to women could shift 
the firm to a new equilibrium whereby women’s increased productivity would warrant the increased investment in 
them. Yamaguchi (2008, 2011) has proposed precisely this form of statistical discrimination (in contradistinction to 
earlier Japanese researchers, such as Koike (1991) and Yashiro (1980) who tended to favor Phelps-type theories) as the 
main reason for the low rates of women managerial participation in Japan where there is much societal pressure on 
women to exit the labor force after childbirth, leading to higher turnover and costs associated with women employees. 
However, the translation of increased female participation into higher productivity is, according to him, due to the role 
model/motivational effect to be discussed below (Yamaguchi, 2012). 
 
Note that the extent of any job-placement discrimination (i.e., discrimination in hiring, promotion, or job 
assignment), as distinguished from wage discrimination, is determined by a company’s “culture” (Barney, 1986b) and 
thus one would not expect to see any sizable effects from such discrimination in longitudinal studies, which control for 
differences among firms (Dezso & Ross, 2012). In cross-sectional studies such as the present one, by contrast, the 
impact should be observable and may be larger than that due to other causes, such as gender diversity. 
 
A popular variant of the discrimination explanation for a possible association between female managerial 
representation and firm performance is the persistent wage differential between men and women, observed globally 
but larger in Japan than most other OECD countries. Although this would not be a factor in those studies focusing on 
top management or corporate boards, where only a few individuals are involved for each company (Carter, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2003), it could be when analyzing the entire workforce or even just middle managers only. In Kawaguchi’s 
well-known finding (Kawaguchi, 2007) that excess profits were earned by Japanese companies in the 1990s from 
employing more women, 5% of the effect was attributable to wage discrimination. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that the perceived benefit to employing more women is actually due to the fact that they tend to constitute a large 
proportion of temporary or contract workers, the utilization of which has been linked to higher corporate performance 
(Kodama, Odaki, & Takahashi, 2005), although this would not explain an association with a higher ratio of female 
managers as opposed to employees. This is to be contrasted with Thurow’s (1975, p. 177) argument that “statistical 
discrimination plays a much larger and more enduring role in the job-competition model than it does in the 
wage-competition model” because employers in hiring and promotion tend to select who they perceive to be the best 
qualified candidate, rather than a less qualified one at a lower salary, and the effect would be more pronounced for 
women managers than for all women employees. Distinction between the manifestation of gender discrimination in 
wage differentials and that in the form of underutilization of female talent (i.e., job-placement discrimination) is less 
significant than it may at first appear, as either case requires sustainable market inefficiency and implies a positive 
relationship between women’s employment and firm performance. However, there is a notable divergence in their 
predicted effects – the efficiency boost from employing cheaper female labor should be linear, whereas that from 
hiring and promoting an undervalued group should show diminishing returns to increasing utilization (cf. below). 
 
Another major category of ways in which employing more female managers may increase firm performance 
is the effect it may have on the productivity of the employees, both men and women. Such female managers may act as 
role models for other female employees, inspiring them to commit more to the company and their careers, which leads 
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to lower absenteeism and turnover, while also motivating them to increase productivity in an effort to further their 
careers (Cox & Blake, 1991; Rosen, Miguel, & Peirce, 1989; Trost, 1989). In particular, this may counteract the strong 
tendency of Japanese women to leave the labor force after marriage or childbirth. Employing more women managers 
may also serve to attract - from outside the firm - better-qualified women candidates for open positions for whom a 
company with more opportunities for advancement would be more appealing, thus raising the average quality of 
women managers. In addition, there could be productivity gains among male managers as well, who would have to 
adjust to a more competitive environment for promotion. 
 
There is substantial literature on how women’s managerial style differs from - and in some ways, may be 
superior to - that of men. Women tend to employ an inclusive and interactive leadership style, relying more on 
cooperation and collaboration with and among subordinates rather than competition or control (Rosener, 1995; Book, 
2000; Eagly & Johnson, 1990). Other authors (Daily & Dalton, 2003; Zhang & Bartol, 2010; Larson, 
Foster-Fisherman, & Franz, 1998) have found that this collaborative and supportive managerial behavior encourages 
information sharing and motivates lower-level employees, amplifying the effects of gender diversity, particularly with 
respect to creativity and innovation, and providing yet another justification for a positive relation between women’s 
managerial representation and firm performance. 
 
Finally, Kodama, Odaki, and Takahashi (2009) have proposed that increasing female managers, per se, does 
not produce better firm performance but, rather, both greater managerial diversity and higher corporate performance 
are consequences of “firm-specific factors,” such as human resources management (HRM). Possible HRM measures 
that increased women’s length of service and career motivation; hence, managerial representation, while also 
impacting firm performance - perhaps through higher female productivity - are family-friendly policies designed to 
allow employees to fulfill their familial responsibilities and gender-equality policies designed to narrow the gender 
gap in hiring, training, and pay (Wakisaka, 2001). In other research unique to Japan, Wakisaka (2007) has 
demonstrated that equal-employment policies and family-friendly policies strongly influence firm performance and 
workplace productivity, using data from a Japanese survey of policies to facilitate work-life balance, while 
Kawaguchi (2009) found that the discipline of managers by investors, in addition to improving firm performance, 
also creates an environment in which it is easier for women to be active, and thereby produces more women 
managers in Japan. 
 
All these arguments act to further strengthen that of Hypothesis 1 in the situation where women do not 
constitute a majority of managers: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Female managerial representation is positively related to firm performance. 
 
Moreover, the relationship in Hypothesis 2 is expected to be stronger than that in Hypothesis 1. 
 
Nonlinear Effects of Increasing Gender Diversity and Female Managerial Representation 
 
In addition to these positive effects, there are also possible negative effects. Moreover, the above positive 
associations are not necessarily linear – most effects may have diminishing returns where the additional profit from 
higher female managerial representation is smaller with increasing representation. Therefore, the relation between 
gender diversity - or female managerial representation - and firm performance should theoretically be curvilinear, 
specifically concave (i.e., an inverted U-shape), with positive slope at low levels of gender diversity - or female 
managerial representation - and smaller positive - or even negative - slope as gender diversity - or female managerial 
representation - approaches its maximum. 
 
Social identity, self-categorization, and similarity-attraction theories imply that diversity can be 
disadvantageous for organizations. According to these theories, individuals tend to be attracted to others whom they 
perceive to fall within the same social categories (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Mannix & Neale, 2005), with gender being a prominent component of 
self-categorization. Moreover, they usually perceive their group to be superior to others. Hence, diverse groups may 
fragment into smaller gender-homogeneous groups with concomitant inter-group communication and cooperation 
difficulties, tensions, and even outright conflicts (Kravitz, 2003; Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Pelled, 1996). Empirical 
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studies (e.g., Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Earley & Mosakowski, 2000; Shapcott, Carron, Burke, Bradshaw, & 
Estabrooks, 2006) have demonstrated these drawbacks as well. Not surprisingly, these negative effects have a 
deleterious impact on group and individual performance (Richard, McMillan, Chadwick, & Dwyer, 2003). 
 
This impairment is considerably stronger at higher levels of gender diversity, as the two groups approach 
each other in size, leading to potential power struggles (Blalock, 1967). Meanwhile, the advantages of diversity, being 
primarily generated by the introduction of new perspectives and backgrounds, would tend to increase more slowly as 
the number of members in the minority group increase, the additional contribution to the group from minority-specific 
novelty having already been largely captured by the earliest minority members. The combination of these two 
assertions yields a relationship between changes in gender diversity and organizational performance that is initially 
positive but then decreases and turns negative at high levels of diversity, which has been observed in previous studies 
(Richard, Kochan, & McMillan-Capehart, 2002; Knouse & Dansby, 1999; Ali, Kulik, & Metz, 2011). This can be 
restated as the following extension of Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Organizational gender diversity has a concave curvilinear relationship to firm performance. 
 
Similarly, for almost all of the effects of female managerial representation on firm performance that are not 
attributable to gender diversity itself, theory would predict diminishing, and in some cases negative, impacts of them 
with higher representation. Obviously, job-placement discrimination, whether it be statistical or taste-based, is less in 
evidence as the utilization rate of female managerial labor approaches that of their relative (versus male managers) 
true ability, and the posited effect between this ratio and firm performance reverses as it exceeds their true ability (as 
under conditions of “reverse discrimination”). At the level of female manager ratio in which the marginal productivity 
of female managers equals that of male managers, there would be no gain to substituting female for male managers, 
whereas at higher ratios, productivity would actually decrease with more women managers. 
 
As with the beneficial effects of gender diversity, the role-model effect also decreases with increasing 
numbers of role models, for identical reasons. Moreover, higher levels of gender diversity may have a de-motivating 
effect on men, leading to move absenteeism and higher turnover (Tsui, Egan, & O’Reilly, 1991). Taken together, these 
results imply that the net effect on employee productivity may become negative at high levels of female managerial 
representation. 
 
By contrast, the improved firm performance due to the wage gap is the only effect considered above that 
would be expected to be linear, even at high levels of female representation. Thus, if the observed relation between the 
female manager ratio and corporate performance is attributable solely to this factor, one would not expect to find 
significant curvature in the relationship. 
 
So long as any of the above effects of gender diversity, job-placement discrimination, or role models are 
significant, the shape of the relationship to firm performance for female managerial representation will, similarly to 
that for gender diversity, be concave. This is summarized as: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Female managerial representation has a concave curvilinear relationship to firm performance. 
 
Again, the relationship in Hypothesis 4 is expected to be stronger than that of Hypothesis 3. Further, note that 
even if none of the direct nonlinear effects of increasing female managers are in evidence, the utilized measure of 
managerial gender diversity (specified below) is already quadratic in the female manager ratio, so Hypothesis 1 would 
imply Hypothesis 4. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample and Data 
 
The sample comprises 745 Japanese-listed companies contained in the CSR data of Toyo Keizai for both 
2007 and 2013. These databases, on employment and HR policies, cover the period 2005-2006 for 1,082 firms and the 
period 2011-2012 for 1,127 firms for the data published in 2007 and 2013, respectively. This source provides data on 
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the numbers of regular employees, regular female employees, and female and male managers; service years of men 
and women; the average age of men and women; in-house daycare facilities; intra-company diversity promotion 
organizations; and performance incentive pay policies. 
 
In addition, data on corporate governance and firm performance variables for 3,387 Japanese-listed 
companies are obtained from NEEDS (Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System), published in 2013 as of the 
year 2012. The data consist of ranks from 1 to 5 for various variables, rather than the underlying raw data. From this 
collection have been selected (the rank of) Tobin’s q1 which is the measure of firm performance, 3-year average ROA 
(operating profit/total asset), operating cash flow, excess liabilities, debt coverage ratio, 3-year average equity 
volatility, extent of stock option system, director’s shareholdings, and external board membership. 
 
The average fractions of revenue from domestic sources during 2008-2012 are calculated from data 
downloaded from Bloomberg, the world’s leading source of corporate accounting information. Industry and industrial 
sector codes and classifications for all 745 companies are also derived from Bloomberg. The UN Global Compact
 2
 
membership list is available on their website. 
 
Of the 745 companies found in Toyo Keizai’s databases for both 2007 and 2013, only 663 are also present in 
the NEEDS database. Moreover, some of those 745 firms lack data for fields such as the number of women managers, 
and detailed revenue data could only be found for 561 of the companies on Bloomberg. As a result, the number of 
observations for the regressions performed ranges between 379 and 464. 
 
A separate set of lagged regressions was run, replacing the percentage of women managers employed, the 
difference of male and female service years, and a dummy variable for the existence of a diversity committee in 2012 
with the corresponding data for 2006. The purpose of these models is to test the long-term effect of the presence of 
women managers on firm performance. 
 
Variables 
 
Firm Performance Variable (Dependent Variable) 
 
In keeping with common practice in corporate governance research, Tobin’s q is utilized as the performance 
measure. Specifically, the variable is the rank (on a scale of 1 to 5) of the average value of Tobin’s q over the 3-year 
period 2010-12, as calculated by and obtained from Nikkei NEEDS for 2013. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
The explanatory variables related to women’s participation in management that are used here are the female 
manager ratio in 2012 (henceforth referred to as the female manager ratio), the same ratio for 2006, and the ratio of the 
female management ratio and the female employee ratio in 2012, which is called the female manager relative ratio.
3
 
The ratio from 2006 is also tested because of the possibility that there might be a time lag, of several years, in the effect 
of changes in the structure of management and the impact on firm performance. The reason for the inclusion of the 
relative ratio is to test the effect of women managers independently of that of women employees, as the respective 
ratios are strongly correlated in Japan (~ 60%; cf. Table 1). 
                                                   
1Tobin’s q, the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement value of the firm’s assets, is “widely viewed as the best measure of a firm’s 
market value” (Dobbin & Jung, 2011). See Deszo and Ross (2012) for a thorough discussion justifying the use of Tobin’s q in preference to 
backward-looking accounting-based performance measures such as ROA. 
2Companies “commit to issue an annual Communication on Progress (COP), a public disclosure to stakeholders (e.g., investors, consumers, civil 
society, governments, etc.) on progress made in implementing the10 principals of the UN Global Compact and in supporting broader UN 
development goals. The COP is frequently the most visible expression of a participant's commitment to the Global Compact and its principles. 
Violations of the COP policy (e.g., failure to issue a COP) will change a participant’s status to non-communicating and can eventually lead to the 
expulsion of the participant” (UN Global Compact, 2013). 
3 Wakisaka (2007) uses a similar ratio, which he calls the “female managerial ratio” and defines as the ratio (female managers/male 
managers)/(female employees/male employees). Wakisaka prefers to use this quantity to the ordinary female manager ratio, the most common 
indicator in the research, in order to separate out promotion and hiring HRM policy effects. 
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As a measure of gender diversity generally, various metrics have been used in the literature, but the most 
common is the Blau index (Blau, 1977): 
 
       
 
   
 
 
where n is the number of groups into which the sample is divided and pi is the proportion of the total sample in group 
i. If the whole population is contained within a single group, then there is no heterogeneity and the index is equal to 
zero. For the case of gender diversity, the Blau index can be expressed as 2x(1 – x), where x is the proportion of women. 
In this case, the Blau index has a maximum value of 1/2 when the proportions of men and women are each 50%. In this 
paper, the Blau index of gender for managers (the “manager gender Blau index”) and for employees (the “employee 
gender Blau index”), with data from 2012 only, are used as the explanatory variables for gender diversity. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Following research in corporate governance and human resource economics, controls are provided for a 
number of variables that previous studies have found to impact individual firm performance. These include 
accounting- and market-based data such as leverage (represented by the variables excess liabilities and debt coverage 
ratio), globalization (incorporated through its opposite, the domestic revenue ratio), ROA, operational cash flow, and 
equity volatility. The ROA and equity volatility are 3-year averages, covering the same 3-year period as the Tobin’s q 
data. With the exception of the domestic revenue ratio, which was derived from annual financial reports available via 
Bloomberg, all the aforementioned control variables are - similarly to Tobin’s q - expressed as ranks from 1 to 5, 
calculated by NEEDS. To these were added two corporate governance measures (the proportion of external board 
members and the amount of shares held by directors, both also ranks derived from NEEDS) and two variables related 
to employee incentive schemes (a dummy for the existence of a performance pay system and the rank of the extent of 
any stock option system). A control for firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the total number of employees, 
was also incorporated. 
 
All regressions included dummy control variables for industry (or, more precisely, industrial sector), using 
the most broad categories corresponding to nine major industrial groups (1-digit codes) in the US-based Standard 
Industrial Classification. 
 
Instrumental Variables 
 
For the 2-stage least squares analysis, one or more exogenous variables that are significantly associated with 
the corresponding measure of female representation or diversity, but not significantly associated with firm 
performance in the ordinary regressions, are required as instruments for the first-stage regression. For such 
instrumental variables were chosen the difference of male and female age, a dummy variable for the existence of an 
intracompany organization for promoting diversity (a so-called diversity committee), a dummy variable for UN 
Global Compact membership, and a dummy variable for the existence of in-house daycare facilities. All of these 
variables have been found to be significantly associated with the female manager ratio. In the models in which the 
measure of women’s managerial representation is the female manager ratio from 2006, the corresponding data from 
2006 are used when available. 
 
Methodology and Models 
 
Cross-Sectional OLS Regression Models 
 
These models are used in this study to explain how and to what extent firm financial performance is affected 
by gender diversity in management, after accounting for the effect of various control variables. The fundamental 
models tested via ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are of the following form: 
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where xi are the control variables listed above, which are the same for every model and submodel, and Performance is 
Tobin’s q. 
 
Each equation is tested for five different choices of explanatory variable Diversity - female manager ratio 
(Model 1), female manager relative ratio (Model 2), female manager ratio 2006 (Model 3), manager gender Blau index 
(Model 4), and employee gender Blau index (Model 5). Equation B (used for Submodels 1B-5B) corresponds to the 
basic proposition that higher levels of gender diversity should lead to better firm performance - Hypotheses 1 and 2 - 
while Equation C corresponds to the hypothesized inverted U-shaped relationship - Hypotheses 3 and 4. Equation A, 
which lacks any of the explanatory variables and is the same for all Submodels 1A-5A, is included for comparison 
with the other submodels. Incremental F-tests are performed for the differences of the R
2
 between Submodels A and B 
and B and C. 
 
White’s general heteroscedasticy (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, pp. 386-388) test standard errors were also 
calculated for these regressions, but the significance of the coefficients using them was the same as with the OLS 
errors, with the exception of the constant term and the excess liabilities control variable, whose significance increased 
using White errors. Only the OLS errors are reported in the results. 
 
Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Analysis (2SLS) 
 
Some of the above OLS regressions (Submodel B) are supplemented here with 2-stage least squares 
regression analysis (2SLS), developed independently by Theil (1953) and Bassmann (1957). As the name indicates, 
the method involves successive applications of OLS, which are straightforward to estimate, first regressing the 
endogenous variable(s) on the remaining independent variables (in this case, the controls) and instruments and then 
regressing the original dependent variable (Tobin’s q) on the control variables and the values of the explanatory 
variable(s) predicted by the first regression equation. Generally, 2SLS is used to control for the possibility of 
endogeneity, such as would arise, for example, in the situation where not only could the female manager ratio affect 
Tobin’s q, but also Tobin’s q could affect the female manager ratio. If this is the case, estimation of Equation B using 
OLS can produce biased coefficient estimates. The following system of equation was estimated using 2SLS: 
 
                                              
                                                   
 
where x and z are vectors of control and instrumental variables, respectively. As before, Performance is Tobin’s q, 
while Diversity could be any of the explanatory variables listed above. Vector x is identical to that in Equations A–D, 
including control variables for firm size, firm leverage, globalization, cash flow, ROA, equity volatility, external board 
membership, directors’ shareholdings, stock option system, performance bonus incentive system, and industry 
dummies. The instruments – difference of male and female service years, existence of diversity committee, UN Global 
Compact membership, and existence of in-house daycare facilities – constitute vector z. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The very low level 
of women’s representation in managerial positions is striking, averaging below 4%, even in 2012. Even when 
adjusting for the low levels of women’s employment overall (the “relative ratio”), the proportion of women in 
management is, on average, 1/6 that of their proportion in the workforce. Not surprisingly, the correlations among the 
various measures of female manager representation are high (typically over 70%), but what is noteworthy is that the 
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correlations of these ratios with the female employee ratio are also sizable, except for that of the relative ratio, 
justifying its use as a predictor to separate out the impact of women managers from that of women employees. Note 
also that over 70% of all firms belong to the Industrial and Consumer Cyclicals and Non-Cyclicals industries. (As 
mentioned earlier, these “industries” are actually industrial sectors; that is, collections of related industries, with one of 
the sectors labeled “Industrial.”) 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
of Firms 
Female manager ratio 0.036 0.065 601 
Female manager relative ratio 0.162 0.166 579 
Female manager ratio, 2006 0.032 0.063 665 
Manager gender Blau index 0.062 0.078 601 
Employee gender Blau index 0.285 0.114 622 
Natural logarithm of number of employees 7.110 1.385 745 
Female employee ratio 0.202 0.138 622 
Domestic revenue %, avg 2008-12 0.774 0.259 561 
Has performance incentive pay system (dummy) 0.824 0.381 733 
Stock option system rank (1 - 5) 3.591 0.913 663 
External directors rank (1 - 5) 2.551 1.775 663 
Directors holdings rank (1 - 5) 2.795 1.465 663 
Operating cashflow rank (1 - 5) 2.974 1.397 663 
ROA, 3yr avg, rank (1 - 5) 2.839 1.360 663 
Excess liabilities rank (1 - 5) 2.997 0.078 663 
Debt coverage ratio rank (1 - 5) 2.685 0.663 663 
Equity volatility, 3yr avg, rank (1 - 5) 3.032 1.406 663 
Diff. of avg. male and female service years, 2006 4.044 3.228 624 
Diff. of avg. male and female service years 3.583 3.280 576 
Has diversity committee, 2006 (dummy) 0.197 0.398 692 
Has diversity committee (dummy) 0.263 0.441 730 
Has in-house daycare center (dummy) 0.066 0.248 745 
Is UN Global Compact member (dummy) 0.054 0.226 745 
Tobin Q, 3-yr avg., rank (1 - 5) 2.955 1.390 663 
Industry - Basic Materials (dummy) 0.073 0.260 745 
Industry - Communications (dummy) 0.035 0.184 745 
Industry - Consumer, Cyclical (dummy) 0.259 0.438 745 
Industry - Consumer, Non-cyclical (dummy) 0.150 0.358 745 
Industry - Energy (dummy) 0.004 0.063 745 
Industry - Financial (dummy) 0.090 0.286 745 
Industry - Industrial (dummy) 0.310 0.463 745 
Industry - Technology (dummy) 0.066 0.248 745 
Industry - Utilities (dummy) 0.013 0.115 745 
Notes: All data are from 2012, unless otherwise indicated. Means for dummy variables are the proportion of firms with the given characteristic. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix of all Variables 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Female manager ratio 
            
2 Female manager relative ratio 0.716*** 
           
3 Female manager ratio 2006 0.865*** 0.593*** 
          
4 Manager gender Blau index 0.858*** 0.788*** 0.800*** 
         
5 Employee gender Blau index 0.363*** 0.127*** 0.380*** 0.499*** 
        
6 Log number of employees -0.038 0.003 -0.100*** -0.052 -0.167*** 
       
7 Female employee ratio 0.597*** 0.195*** 0.590*** 0.622*** 0.792*** -0.029 
      
8 Domestic revenue %, avg 2008-12 0.183*** 0.090* 0.200*** 0.220*** 0.246*** -0.278*** 0.268*** 
     
9 Performance incentive pay policy -0.195*** -0.096** -0.152*** -0.148*** -0.163*** 0.222*** -0.194*** -0.130*** 
    
10 Stock option system rank 0.032 0.042 0.047 0.078* 0.045 0.159*** 0.033 -0.207*** 0.132*** 
   
11 External directors rank 0.038 0.109** 0.047 0.109** 0.068 0.182*** 0.035 -0.160*** 0.058 0.160*** 
  
12 Directors holdings rank 0.134*** -0.012 0.143*** 0.107** 0.231*** -0.550*** 0.252*** 0.246*** -0.172*** -0.106*** -0.254*** 
 
13 Operating CF rank 0.050 0.042 0.022 0.037 -0.058 0.202*** -0.026 -0.117*** 0.088** 0.194*** 0.121*** -0.152*** 
14 ROA 3yr avg rank 0.181*** 0.130*** 0.170*** 0.199*** 0.199*** -0.009 0.202*** 0.047 0.030 0.116*** 0.054 0.018 
15 Excess liabilities rank 0.023 0.042 0.020 0.034 0.078* 0.047 0.052 -0.009 0.087** 0.025 -0.054 -0.032 
16 Debt coverage ratio rank 0.080* 0.094** 0.069* 0.093** 0.021 0.126*** 0.030 -0.078* 0.027 0.109*** 0.068* -0.025 
17 Equity volitility 3yr avg rank -0.089** -0.129*** -0.059 -0.178*** -0.208*** -0.042 -0.167*** -0.363*** 0.028 0.056 0.025 -0.017 
18 Diff. service yrs. M-F 2006 -0.165*** -0.211*** -0.187*** -0.180*** -0.100** 0.031 -0.036 0.100** -0.019 -0.064 -0.106** 0.022 
19 Diff. service yrs. M-F -0.088** -0.129*** -0.132*** -0.093** -0.070* 0.030 0.005 0.197*** -0.007 -0.084* -0.133*** 0.101** 
20 Diversity committee 2006 0.054 0.075* 0.015 0.096** 0.099** 0.427*** 0.116*** -0.127*** 0.089** 0.103** 0.185*** -0.221*** 
21 Diversity committee 0.022 0.103** -0.030 0.077* 0.048 0.524*** 0.056 -0.244*** 0.140*** 0.208*** 0.165*** -0.330*** 
22 In-house daycare center 0.045 0.109*** 0.024 0.072* -0.020 0.335*** -0.020 -0.214*** 0.081** 0.193*** 0.123*** -0.212*** 
23 UN Global Compact 0.014 0.114*** -0.017 0.039 -0.002 0.258*** -0.026 -0.238*** 0.078** 0.107*** 0.211*** -0.235*** 
24 Tobin's q, 3yr avg. rank 0.104** 0.112** 0.072* 0.135*** 0.068 0.378*** 0.065 -0.272*** 0.077** 0.207*** 0.215*** -0.341*** 
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Table 2 cont. 
 
Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 Female manager ratio                       
2 Female manager relative ratio                       
3 Female manager ratio 2006                       
4 Manager gender Blau index                       
5 Employee gender Blau index                       
6 Log number of employees                       
7 Female employee ratio                       
8 Domestic revenue %, avg 2008-12                       
9 Performance incentive pay policy                       
10 Stock option system rank                       
11 External directors rank                       
12 Directors holdings rank                       
13 Operating CF rank                       
14 ROA 3yr avg rank 0.389***                     
15 Excess liabilities rank -0.001 0.053                   
16 Debt coverage ratio rank 0.506*** 0.294*** 0.040                 
17 Equity volitility 3yr avg rank -0.054 -0.317*** -0.055 -0.156***               
18 Diff. service yrs. M-F 2006 -0.102** -0.096** 0.029 -0.037 -0.130***             
19 Diff. service yrs. M-F -0.116*** -0.045 -0.011 -0.041 -0.193*** 0.851***           
20 Diversity committee 2006 0.043 -0.061 0.019 0.051 0.007 0.050 0.041         
21 Diversity committee 0.097** 0.000 0.023 0.073* -0.009 -0.011 -0.018 0.641***       
22 In-house daycare center 0.117*** 0.010 0.011 0.065* -0.006 -0.033 0.049 0.228*** 0.300***     
23 UN Global Compact 0.019 -0.089** 0.009 0.004 0.070* -0.082** -0.082** 0.267*** 0.294*** 0.225***   
24 Tobin's q, 3yr avg. rank 0.323*** 0.301*** -0.029 0.035 0.046 -0.156*** -0.147*** 0.139*** 0.257*** 0.216*** 0.156*** 
Notes: All data are from 2012 unless otherwise indicated. * indicates p < 0.10; ** indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
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Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
 
Tables 3-7 report the cross-sectional regression analysis testing all four hypotheses. For each of the Models 
1-5 mentioned above, Submodels A–C were calculated, where A includes no variable for female representation or 
gender diversity, B has an additional term linear in such variable, and C also incorporates a quadratic term in the same 
variable. 
 
Every regression has an F-statistic significant at the 0.01 level, with an adjusted R
2
 of at least 0.375. 
Moreover, the addition of variables related to female managerial representation or gender diversity always increases 
the adjusted R
2 
with an incremental F-test (of Submodel B vs. A) that is significant at least the 0.10 level (and 0.05 
level for 4 out of 5 models). All three female manager ratio variables are significantly (p < 0.05) positively linearly 
associated with higher values of Tobin’s q, while gender diversity, as represented by Blau’s index, is positively linearly 
associated with higher values of Tobin’s q at even more significant levels (p < 0.01), providing strong support for 
Hypothesis 1 and, to a lesser extent, Hypothesis 2. The regressions with the 6-year lagged female manager ratio have 
the lowest levels of significance (as measured by F-statistic, adjusted R
2
, and incremental F-test, as well as the t-test of 
the predictor coefficient), failing to provide support for the notion that changes in women’s representation should take 
several years to fully impact firm performance. Regressions using the female manager relative ratio (vs. the female 
employee ratio) have similar results to those using the ordinary ratio, implying that the positive effect on firm 
performance of higher female managerial participation may not be solely attributable to the effect of higher female 
employment, generally. 
 
Almost all of the control variables involving accounting or market data; namely, ROA, operating cash flow, 
debt coverage, equity volatility, domestic revenue proportion, and firm size, are very significant (p < 0.01), whereas 
those involving ownership structure or compensation systems tend not to be significant (at even the 0.1 level), except 
in the regressions involving a lagged female manager ratio. Having more directors from outside the company is also 
positively associated with higher Tobin’s q, but the p-values for this coefficient range from less than 1% in one 
regression to more than 10% in another, with the significance tending to decline with increasing complexity of the 
model. 
 
The addition of a quadratic term in Submodel C causes the analysis to exhibit the inverted U shape predicted 
by theory, as all such quadratic terms have negative coefficients, significantly different from zero for four out of five 
models. The p-values for the quadratic terms tend to be somewhat higher than those for the linear terms, with the 
coefficients for the linear predictors increasing in significance with the addition of the quadratic terms for those same 
four models, and the incremental F-test is significant at the 0.1 level, or better, for these models as well. All of these 
observations imply that the relation of female manager ratio or manager gender diversity to Tobin’s q is actually 
curvilinear rather than just linear, which is Hypothesis 4 and part of Hypothesis 3. The addition of the quadratic terms 
in female manager ratio has a much more significant impact on Tobin’s q than such terms involving Blau’s index, 
perhaps because a gender diversity Blau index is already quadratic in the female representation ratio, so a linear Blau 
index term would correspond to a combination of a linear and quadratic term, with opposite signs, in the female 
representation ratio, while a quadratic Blau index term would correspond to a quartic polynomial in the female 
representation ratio. Also notable is the fact that linear and quadratic coefficients in Model 2C are of approximately 
equal size, as it would correspond to a purely linear term in Blau’s index - Model 4B - implying that the primary cause 
of higher Tobin’s q, with increasing women’s managerial representation, may perhaps, in fact, be due solely to greater 
gender diversity. However, this effect can also be observed in Model 1C, where it cannot be as easily interpreted, while 
in Model 3C, the quadratic term is approximately twice the size of the linear term. The quadratic model for employee 
gender diversity (Model 5C) is the only one that was not a significant improvement over the linear version, 
contradicting the remaining part of Hypothesis 3. This suggests that the negative effects of “excessive” levels of 
gender diversity may be stronger for managerial positions than for lower-level employees. 
 
None of the pairs of independent variables in the regressions exhibit high correlations, all variance inflation 
factors are less than 2, and for every regression, multiple variables are highly significant in addition to the overall 
F-statistic, indicating that multicollinearity does not appear to be a concern. 
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Table 3: Cross-Sectional Regression (OLS) Estimate of the Relationship between the  
Current Female Manager Ratio and Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) 
 Model 
Variable 1A 1B 1C 
Constant 3.156* 3.445** 3.447** 
 (1.748) (1.746) (1.728) 
Female manager ratio  1.788** 6.795*** 
  (0.841) (1.820) 
Female manager ratio squared   -8.425*** 
   (2.724) 
Domestic revenue %, avg 2008-12 -0.861*** -0.920*** -0.952*** 
 (0.247) (0.247) (0.245) 
Performance incentive pay policy -0.161 -0.093 -0.114 
 (0.157) (0.157) (0.158) 
Stock option system rank 0.069 0.066 0.048 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) 
External directors rank 0.077** 0.071** 0.054* 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Directors holdings rank -0.042 -0.056 -0.050 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) 
Operating CF rank 0.181*** 0.182*** 0.189*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) 
ROA 3yr avg rank 0.283*** 0.270*** 0.269*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) 
Excess liabilities rank -0.762 -0.809 -0.838 
 (0.537) (0.535) (0.529) 
Debt coverage ratio rank -0.389*** -0.396*** -0.403*** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.094) 
Equity volatility 3yr avg rank 0.104** 0.097** 0.123** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Log number employees 0.344*** 0.333*** 0.344*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
    
N 424 424 424 
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.398 0.411 
F-Statistic 15.40*** 15.00*** 15.00*** 
R2  0.006 0.013 
Incremental F-Statistic  4.469** 9.342*** 
Notes: The change in R
2
 and incremental F-test reported for Models B and C correspond to the differences between Models A and B and B and C, respectively. 
Dummy variables were also included for 1-digit SIC industry. The measure of firm performance is the ranking from 1 to 5, by Nikkei NEEDS, of the mean 
value over three years of Tobin’s q. All data are from 2012, unless otherwise indicated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, beneath the parameter 
estimates. Probability values are based on a t-statistic for a two-tailed test of significance. * indicates p < 0.10; ** indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
 
Table 4: Cross-Sectional Regression (OLS) Estimate of the Relationship between the  
Current Female Manager Relative Ratio and Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) 
 Model 
Variable 2A 2B 2C 
Constant 3.265* 3.427** 3.406* 
 (1.747) (1.739) (1.733) 
Female manager relative ratio  0.765** 2.153*** 
  (0.336) (0.810) 
Female manager relative ratio squared   -2.165* 
   (1.150) 
Domestic revenue %, avg 2008-12 -0.983*** -1.020*** -1.036*** 
 (0.253) (0.252) (0.251) 
Performance incentive pay policy -0.184 -0.155 -0.186 
 (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) 
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Table 4 cont. 
Stock option system rank 0.086 0.079 0.065 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
External directors rank 0.078** 0.069** 0.064** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Directors holdings rank -0.025 -0.025 -0.018 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Operating CF rank 0.161*** 0.164*** 0.170*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
ROA 3yr avg rank 0.297*** 0.293*** 0.292*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Excess liabilities rank -0.747 -0.798 -0.815 
 (0.535) (0.532) (0.531) 
Debt coverage ratio rank -0.377*** -0.382*** -0.375*** 
 (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) 
Equity volatility 3yr avg rank 0.117** 0.124** 0.133*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Log number employees 0.334*** 0.324*** 0.319*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
    
N 407 407 407 
Adjusted R2 0.397 0.404 0.408 
F-Statistic 15.10*** 14.70*** 14.30*** 
R2  0.008 0.005 
Incremental F-Statistic  5.118** 3.509* 
Notes: The change in R
2
 and incremental F-test reported for Models B and C correspond to the differences between Models A and B and B and C, respectively. 
Dummy variables were also included for 1-digit SIC industry. The measure of firm performance is the ranking from 1 to 5, by Nikkei NEEDS, of the mean 
value over three years of Tobin’s q. All data are from 2012, unless otherwise indicated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, beneath the parameter 
estimates. Probability values are based on a t-statistic for a two-tailed test of significance. * indicates p < 0.10; ** indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
 
Table 5: Cross-Sectional Regression (OLS) Estimate of the Relationship between the  
Lagged Female Manager Ratio and Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) 
 Model 
Variable 3A 3B 3C 
Constant 3.642** 3.810** 3.731** 
 (1.795) (1.791) (1.784) 
Female manager ratio 2006  1.977** 5.969*** 
  (1.003) (2.151) 
Female manager ratio 2006 squared   -11.614** 
   (5.540) 
Domestic revenue %, avg 2008-12 -0.923*** -0.973*** -0.978*** 
 (0.243) (0.244) (0.243) 
Performance incentive pay policy -0.307** -0.263* -0.299** 
 (0.148) (0.149) (0.149) 
Stock option system rank 0.043 0.038 0.034 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) 
External directors rank 0.074** 0.069** 0.064** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Directors holdings rank -0.099** -0.109** -0.108** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Operating CF rank 0.186*** 0.192*** 0.197*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
ROA 3yr avg rank 0.300*** 0.286*** 0.291*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Excess liabilities rank -0.694 -0.729 -0.732 
 (0.552) (0.550) (0.548) 
Debt coverage ratio rank -0.401*** -0.408*** -0.410*** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
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Table 5 cont. 
Equity volatility 3yr avg rank 0.105** 0.099** 0.116** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Log number employees 0.304*** 0.302*** 0.308*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
    
N 464 464 464 
Adjusted R2 0.375 0.379 0.384 
F-Statistic 15.60*** 15.10*** 14.70*** 
R2  0.005 0.006 
Incremental F-Statistic  3.849* 4.353** 
Notes: The change in R
2
 and incremental F-test reported for Models B and C correspond to the differences between Models A and B and B and C, respectively. 
Dummy variables were also included for 1-digit SIC industry. The measure of firm performance is the ranking from 1 to 5, by Nikkei NEEDS, of the mean 
value over three years of Tobin’s q. All data are from 2012, unless otherwise indicated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, beneath the parameter 
estimates. Probability values are based on a t-statistic for a two-tailed test of significance. * indicates p < 0.10; ** indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
 
Table 6: Cross-Sectional Regression (OLS) Estimate of the Relationship between the  
Manager Gender Blau Index and Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) 
 Model 
Variable 4A 4B 4C 
Constant 3.156* 3.542** 3.460** 
 (1.748) (1.727) (1.721) 
Manager gender Blau index  2.931*** 6.491*** 
  (0.820) (2.010) 
Mgr gender Blau index squared   -12.331* 
   (6.362) 
Domestic revenue %, avg 2008-12 -0.861*** -0.962*** -0.965*** 
 (0.247) (0.245) (0.244) 
Performance incentive pay policy -0.161 -0.085 -0.120 
 (0.157) (0.156) (0.157) 
Stock option system rank 0.069 0.052 0.046 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) 
External directors rank 0.077** 0.058* 0.053* 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Directors holdings rank -0.042 -0.056 -0.046 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
Operating CF rank 0.181*** 0.187*** 0.193*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
ROA 3yr avg rank 0.283*** 0.265*** 0.266*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Excess liabilities rank -0.762 -0.845 -0.859 
 (0.537) (0.529) (0.528) 
Debt coverage ratio rank -0.389*** -0.403*** -0.400*** 
 (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) 
Equity volatility 3yr avg rank 0.104** 0.113** 0.129*** 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) 
Log number employees 0.344*** 0.337*** 0.340*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
    
N 424 424 424 
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.41 0.414 
F-Statistic 15.40*** 15.70*** 15.20*** 
R2  0.018 0.005 
Incremental F-Statistic  12.387*** 3.722* 
Notes: The change in R
2
 and incremental F-test reported for Models B and C correspond to the differences between Models A and B and B and C, respectively. 
Dummy variables were also included for 1-digit SIC industry. The measure of firm performance is the ranking from 1 to 5, by Nikkei NEEDS, of the mean 
value over three years of Tobin’s q. All data are from 2012, unless otherwise indicated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, beneath the parameter 
estimates. Probability values are based on a t-statistic for a two-tailed test of significance. * indicates p < 0.10; ** indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
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Table 7: Cross-Sectional Regression (OLS) Estimate of the Relationship between  
Employee Gender Blau Index and Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) 
 Model 
Variable 5A 5B 5C 
Constant 3.216* 3.387** 3.199* 
 (1.745) (1.703) (1.709) 
Employee gender Blau index  2.650*** 5.570** 
  (0.570) (2.532) 
Empl gender Blau index squared   -5.213 
   (4.404) 
Domestic revenue %, avg 2008-12 -0.888*** -0.912*** -0.866*** 
 (0.246) (0.240) (0.243) 
Performance incentive pay policy -0.228 -0.113 -0.141 
 (0.154) (0.152) (0.154) 
Stock option system rank 0.074 0.059 0.061 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) 
External directors rank 0.087*** 0.061* 0.062* 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Directors holdings rank -0.049 -0.075 -0.074 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) 
Operating CF rank 0.163*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
ROA 3yr avg rank 0.294*** 0.257*** 0.260*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Excess liabilities rank -0.719 -0.986* -1.054** 
 (0.537) (0.527) (0.530) 
Debt coverage ratio rank -0.322*** -0.344*** -0.348*** 
 (0.095) (0.093) (0.093) 
Equity volatility 3yr avg rank 0.133*** 0.160*** 0.162*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) 
Log number employees 0.329*** 0.352*** 0.354*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
    
N 428 428 428 
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.434 0.435 
F-Statistic 16.30*** 17.40*** 16.60*** 
R2  0.029 0.002 
Incremental F-Statistic  20.509*** 1.397 
Notes: The change in R
2
 and incremental F-test reported for Models B and C correspond to the differences between Models A and B and B and C, respectively. 
Dummy variables are also included for 1-digit SIC industry. The measure of firm performance is the ranking from 1 to 5, by Nikkei NEEDS, of the mean 
value over three years of Tobin’s q. All data are from 2012, unless otherwise indicated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, beneath the parameter 
estimates. Probability values are based on a t-statistic for a two-tailed test of significance. * indicates p < 0.10; ** indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
 
2SLS Regression Analysis 
 
Table 8 provides the results for the 2SLS models. The F-statistic for each model is significant at the 0.01 level. 
After controlling for the same firm-level and industry effects as before, the women’s managerial participation - or 
gender diversity variable - is positively associated to Tobin’s q in all models at significance levels of p < 0.05. R2 - or 
adjusted R
2
 - are not reported for either stage of the regressions as they are not meaningful in 2SLS. Similar p-values 
were observed for all the control variables as with the OLS regressions presented in Submodel B. 
 
This analysis reaffirms the previous results supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2, even in the possible presence of 
endogeneity in the predictor variables. In particular, the hypothesis that the association between Tobin’s q and 
women’s participation variables is due solely to reverse causality; that is, to higher values of Tobin’s q leading to 
higher female ratios, is rejected. Thus, one can be more confident that the preceding OLS coefficient estimates were 
not unduly biased. Simply, the 2SLS analysis provides strong support for the posited links between firm performance 
and both female manager ratio and gender diversity. 
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Table 8: 2SLS Regression Estimate of the Relationship between Firm Performance (Tobin’s Q) and  
Various Measures of Female Managerial Representation and Gender Diversity 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Constant 4.567** 3.951** 4.623** 4.335** 3.923** 
 (1.900) (1.806) (1.987) (1.787) (1.785) 
Female manager ratio 9.719**     
 (4.777)     
Female manager relative ratio  2.735**    
  (1.388)    
Female manager ratio 2006   11.506**   
   (5.610)   
Manager gender Blau index    6.890**  
    (3.198)  
Employee gender Blau index     5.951** 
     (2.851) 
Domestic revenue %, avg 2008-12 -1.298*** -1.129*** -1.387*** -1.246*** -1.072*** 
 (0.313) (0.279) (0.319) (0.287) (0.273) 
Performance incentive pay policy 0.135 -0.081 -0.147 0.032 0.036 
 (0.219) (0.172) (0.201) (0.183) (0.212) 
Stock option system rank 0.063 0.073 -0.010 0.053 0.050 
 (0.067) (0.065) (0.074) (0.066) (0.066) 
External directors rank 0.012 0.016 0.056 0.003 0.005 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.043) 
Directors holdings rank -0.072 -0.028 -0.141** -0.060 -0.107* 
 (0.055) (0.053) (0.057) (0.051) (0.055) 
Operating CF rank 0.174*** 0.168*** 0.226*** 0.180*** 0.246*** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.060) (0.053) (0.065) 
ROA 3yr avg rank 0.238*** 0.302*** 0.222*** 0.264*** 0.223*** 
 (0.063) (0.051) (0.068) (0.054) (0.063) 
Excess liabilities rank -1.039* -0.982* -0.801 -1.003* -1.371** 
 (0.570) (0.554) (0.600) (0.541) (0.613) 
Debt coverage ratio rank -0.462*** -0.456*** -0.418*** -0.458*** -0.443*** 
 (0.107) (0.104) (0.108) (0.101) (0.103) 
Equity volatility 3yr avg rank 0.097* 0.161*** 0.090 0.145*** 0.185*** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.052) (0.057) 
Log number employees 0.333*** 0.320*** 0.279*** 0.334*** 0.390*** 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.055) (0.060) 
            
N 381 379 404 381 393 
F-Statistic 13.04*** 13.55*** 11.62*** 14.33*** 15.01*** 
Notes: Dummy variables are also included for 1-digit SIC industry. The measure of firm performance is the ranking from 1 to 5, by Nikkei NEEDS, 
of the mean value over three years of Tobin’s q. All data are from 2012, unless otherwise indicated. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, 
beneath the parameter estimates. Probability values are based on a t-statistic for a two-tailed test of significance. * indicates p < 0.10; ** indicates p 
< 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.01. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Studies of, the impact on firm performance of higher utilization of women have produced mixed results, but 
most of these have focused on women directors, senior executives, or employees, or have been conducted in countries 
with much higher rates of female managerial participation than in Japan. They also have tended not to examine 
higher-order terms in the relationship between such participation rates and firm valuation. This research is meant to 
address these gaps, both by testing specifically the female manager ratio’s association with firm performance, in a 
robust way, and also by more fully mapping out the contours of this complex relationship. 
 
After controlling for size, industry, and various accounting, capital structure, compensation policy, and 
corporate governance indicators, the authors find statistically significant positive relationships between firm 
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performance and both the percentage of managers who are women and, more broadly, gender diversity, in both 
management and total workforce. The effect due to female managers appears to be independent of the proportion of 
women among all employees, with no evidence that a long lag (in excess of three years) is required for it to be realized. 
Moreover, the significance of this effect remained even when performing analyses that correct for possible 
endogeneity, making the possibility that the results are due to reverse causation unlikely. 
 
Furthermore, this analysis yields, in the case of managers, that these relationships exhibit negative curvature, 
with diminishing returns to higher proportions of women and greater gender diversity, although such a negative effect 
for high levels of diversity is not found for the only case considered involving all employees. Hence, these results in 
this regard resemble those of Richard, Barnett, Dwyer, and Chadwick (2004) for the United States but not Ali et al. 
(2011) for Australia. One question that this study raises, but cannot answer, is whether the positive effect of a higher 
female manager ratio can be attributed solely to the positive effect of more gender diversity, but in two out of three 
analyses involving women managers, this appears to be a strong possibility. A possible direction for future research 
would be to conduct analyses capable of testing against one another the various hypothesized mechanisms by which 
higher women’s managerial participation leads to better firm performance. 
 
Another line of inquiry that could be fruitful to pursue in subsequent studies would be to seek variables that 
may moderate these relationships between firm performance and female managerial representation. The 
aforementioned study of Ali et al., as well as that of Siegel and Kodama (2011), used a dichotomous classification of 
companies as manufacturing or services. However, when a similar analysis is performed on the data set of this study, 
using the same industry typing as Ali et al., no significant difference in these relationships is observed when 
manufacturing and services firms are analyzed separately, nor are the effects of the (non-significant) differences 
consistent across analyses involving different measures of women’s managerial participation. It may be that the 
categories “manufacturing” and “services” are too broad and not sufficiently distinct to derive meaningful 
comparisons between them. In subsequent investigations, the authors intend to focus on other axes along which 
companies may lie that do moderate this relationship; for example, the degree of innovation (similarly utilized by 
Richard et al. (2004) and Deszo and Ross, (2012)) or the degree to which a company follows traditional Japanese 
HRM practices that may fulfill this role. 
 
Among the limitations of this study is that it is cross-sectional, relying on only firm performance data for one 
period. In addition, only approximately 40% of the more than 1,000 companies in the database have a complete set of 
data to perform any of the analyses. Another major qualification is that for most companies the proportion of women 
managers was so low, averaging under 4%, that extrapolating to very high female manager ratios, where the negative 
quadratic effects become significant, is difficult. Furthermore, at these low levels of this ratio, the difference between 
the ratio itself and the Blau index for manager gender diversity becomes negligible, making it difficult to distinguish 
benefits accruing to more women managers from those deriving from more gender diversity in general. 
 
Nonetheless, these results offer new, robust evidence for a link between Japanese firm performance and 
women’s managerial participation. Japanese firms would be wise to avail themselves of this readily accessible source 
of competitive advantage. 
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